My interpretation of our two-door strategy meant our primary mission was making DFP the best total revenue management solution, across direct and indirect inventory together; and AdX for non-DFPs was an edge case, not the focus. If we want YM / AdX to make sense entirely without DFP, it would mean minimizing YM features in DFP, to avoid confusion or duplicated effort.

Summarizing -- it sounds like the upshot of this strategy is to compete with the yield managers by investing in more publisher-centric features for AdX, plus an expanded services layer. The devil's advocate question I could imagine stakeholders asking is, how is this materially different from what the AdX publisher strategy was before we started talking about the YM challenge back at the strat summit?

I think getting backfill revenue through the combo of DFP and AdX was a fundamental component of our strategy (and one of the reasons why Google bought DCLK in the first place). And in general it is working — just look at the backfill growth rates. But the reality is we missed the YM threat — both on the AdX side as well as the DFP side. And this was a core mission of AdX. So I think we are altering our approach on both AdX as well as DFP and sales/services to get this right.